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DUE PROCESS FOR ARTICLE III-RETHINKING
MURRA Y'S LESSEE
Kent Barnett*

INTRODUCTION

Article III provides that "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts" that "Congress
may . . . establish."' These courts' judges "shall hold their Offices during
good Behaviour, and shall .. . receive . .. a Compensation, which shall not
be diminished during their Continuance in Office." 2 The judicial power extends to, among other things, all "Controversies to which the United States
shall be a Party."' From this text, one might have presupposed that the protected judges of Article III courts must preside over cases in which the U.S.
government is a party.
Not so. Instead, based largely on notions of historical practice and efficiency, the Supreme Court has consistently reduced Article III's domain
when the government is a party under the "public-rights" exception. In its
current formulation, the public-rights exception reaches, in brief, to cases
"which arise between the Government and persons subject to its authority in
connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments." 4 Article III does not apply to public rights.
In contrast, resolution of some kind by Article III courts is required for "private rights": those matters concerning "the liability of one individual to another under the law as defined,"' and suits at common law, equity, or admiralty.6 Public rights have, however, extended even to cases over liability between two private parties as part of a complex regulatory scheme.' As this
brief description suggests, this exception presents "a most difficult area of

* J. Alton Hosch Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. I appreciate
the extremely helpful guidance that I received from Nathan Chapman.
1 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
2

3
4
5
6

id

Id. § 2, cl. 1.
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932).
Id. at 51.
See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856)
("[W]e do not consider congress can . . . withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its
nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty . . . .").
7 See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 589 (1985).
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constitutional law," where "precedents are horribly murky" and "doctrinal
confusion abounds."8
The modem formulation of the public-rights exception was neither compelled nor inevitable. Public rights may have taken several forms under the
seminal yet enigmatic precedent, Murray 's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.9 They potentially existed whenever Congress sought to use
non-Article III courts to administer programs under its Article I authority,
whenever the U.S. government was a party, or whenever the dispute concerned privileges (also referred to as benefits) from the government. But in
the decades since its inception, the second of these three possible grounds
won out. The public-rights exception came to stand for, at least, those matters
in which the government was a party-whether a dispute concerning privileges or benefits, or one of regulatory enforcement. The exception's expansive domain stands in tension with Article III's purpose of promoting judicial
independence from the other two branches. In cases where the government is
a party and thus has an interest in the litigation, opposing parties have become
least entitled to Article III judges. And in cases where the government is not
a party and has minimal interests in the litigation, private parties have become
most entitled to Article III's independent judges.
This Essay for the George Mason Law Review's "Agency Adjudication
and the Rule of Law" symposium argues that a narrow interpretation of Murray 's Lessee-as extending the public-rights exception, in general, only to
matters concerning privileges or benefits-is best. Not only does the best
reading of the decision's text support this limited exception, but this narrow
interpretation would also have permitted the public-rights exception to develop in a more justifiable, coherent manner. A limited benefits-based exception could have simply had an inverse relationship with the Due Process
Clause: the public-rights exception would apply only whenever government
action fails to trigger the Due Process Clause. This understanding, as Professors Nathan Chapman and Michael McConnell have recently reminded
scholars,' 0 would have been consistent with the Due Process Clause's often
forgotten purpose of preserving separation of powers and respecting Article
III. Under traditional notions, the Due Process Clause only applied when, as
relevant here, the government deprived individuals of a vested property right.
This Essay concludes by considering the benefits and costs of having
Article III evolve alongside due process. Under modern doctrine, due process
extends to deprivations of legitimate claims of entitlements and not merely
to vested property rights, as are most relevant here. Regardless of whether
Article III and due process should track one another precisely, tying them to
8

H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 70 (1977), as reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6030 (letter from

Thomas G. Krattenmaker).

9 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
10

See Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process As SeparationofPowers, 121

YALE L.J. 1672, 1803 (2012).
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one another would provide a more coherent and predictable public-rights exception that recognizes Article III's purpose.
This Essay's discussion is limited in nature. First, it assumes that the
Court would retain the public-private distinction. Second, it does not consider exactly what Article III requires when it applies. For instance, it may
be that meaningful appellate review," including current review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),1 2 satisfies Article III minima. And instead
of focusing on the reach of private rights and their status under Article III,
this Essay concentrates on the other, oft-obscured side of the public-privaterights coin. Finally, given the space restraints, what follows is not an exhaustive historical or doctrinal account of Article III or the public-rights exception. Rather, the purpose of this Essay is to encourage scholars and courts to
consider a more coherent public-rights exception and to facilitate a better understanding of Murray's Lessee.
I.

THE TEXT AND PURPOSE OF ARTICLE III

Article III does two key things, as relevant to the public-rights exception. First, it prescribes two mechanisms to promote federal judges' independence. Second, it defines, to some extent, "[t]he judicial Power of the
United States," which is vested in these judges. 3 The former clarifies, in
large part,1 4 what the debate over the exception is about, and the latter helps
us consider the reach of Article III.
The two indicia of independence are familiar: judges "hold their Offices
during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services,
a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office."', These two protections directly addressed concerns in the Declaration of Independence over judges' dependence on the King for their jobs and
pay.'" They also serve two interrelated purposes: first, they seek to promote
11 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., OfLegislativeCourts, AdministrativeAgencies, andArticleIII, 101 HARV.
L. REv. 915, 918 (1988) ("Thus the central claim of my appellate review theory: adequately searching
appellate review of the judgments of legislative courts and administrative agencies is both necessary and
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of article III."); see also Martin H. Redish, Legislative Courts, AdministrativeAgencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197, 227 (arguing that meaningful appellate review could satisfy Article III concerns).

12 See 5 U.S.C.
13
14

§ 706 (2012).

U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
Aside from a neutral forum, parties seeking an Article III tribunal may also be seeking a jury
trial.

See U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Matters concerning public rights do not require Article III courts or juries
under the Seventh Amendment. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 n.4 (1989).
15

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
TIIE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 10 (U.S. 1776) ("He has made judges dependent
on
his will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries."); ERWIN
16

CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION4 (7th ed. 2016). One disagreement concerned whether Congress
could increase Article III judges' salaries. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: Constitutional

680
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impartial decision-making by shielding judges from the Damocles sword of
removal or pay cuts. I" Second, they provide a meaningful separation of the
judicial and political branches, allowing judges to serve as an effective
weapon against tyranny by checking other branches that transgress constitutional or statutory boundaries." Ultimately, these criteria help protect the unpopular-whether in litigation with the government or with other individu9
als-from the competing branches' (and agencies') favorites.'
20
These protections were not controversial to the constitutional drafters.
Instead, as Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has noted, the most significant debate
was over whether the federal government even needed inferior federal courts
or could simply rely on the state courts with potentially limited rights of appeal to the Supreme Court.2 1 A compromise allowed Congress to decide
whether to establish inferior courts and modify the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.22 As explained below, this grant of discretion to Congress to
establish inferior courts is relevant to debates over Article III's scope.
Article III judges of the Supreme Court and any inferior courts Congress
23
chooses to create are vested with "[t]he judicial Power of the United States."
It may have surprised the Founders how much confusion has come to surround this phrase, given that the second section of Article III provides an
extremely detailed description, relative to other constitutional provisions, of
that power. In fact, as relevant here, this definition would appear to indicate
that the Article III judiciary must resolve cases in which the United States is
a party or cases which concern federal law. The judicial power extends to,
among other things, "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under [the] Constitution, [or] the Laws of the United States," not to mention "Controversies
to which the United States shall be a Party." 2 4 Alexander Hamilton argued
Limitationson Congress'Authorityto Regulate the Jurisdictionof the FederalCourts, 95 HARV. L. REV.
17, 61 (1981). Over James Madison's objection, the constitutional language permits increases, but not
reductions. Id at 61 n.136.
17 See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1380 (2018)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (discussing Founders' intent to provide judicial independence by not permitting
the political branches to control reappointments for a term of years and salary fluctuation); THE
FEDERALIST No. 79, at 471-73 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003); Maryellen Fullerton,
No Light at the End of the Pipeline. Confusion Surrounds Legislative Courts, 49 BROOK. L. REv. 207,

211 (1983).
18 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 464-65, 469-70 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
2003); Fullerton, supra note 17, at 211-12.
19 Oil States Energy Servs., LLC, 138 S. Ct. at 1381 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
20 See Sager, supra note 16, at 61 ("[T]he decision to secure radical independence for the federal
judiciary found a rare degree of consensus among the framers.").
21 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 214-15; see also James Madison, Notes ofDebates in the
FederalConvention ofl 787, at 72-73 (Adrienne Koch ed., Ohio Univ. Press) (1966) [hereinafter Madison's Notes].
22 See Madison'sNotes, supra note 21, at 72-73.
23 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
24 Id. § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
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during debates over the Constitution's ratification that any plan other than
one that referred "Controversies between the nation and its members or citizens" to federal courts "would be contrary to reason, to precedent, and to
decorum."
H.

25

ARTICLE IHl EXCEPTIONS

As Professor Richard Fallon noted about thirty years ago, "[b]y nearly
universal consensus, the most plausible construction of [Article III's text]
would hold that if Congress creates any adjudicative bodies at all, it must
grant them the protections of judicial independence that are contemplated by
article III."26 But the Supreme Court has taken a different path, creating a
significant space for non-Article III tribunals in three key areas: territorial
courts, courts martial, and public rights. This Essay concentrates on the last
area.
Congress has permitted both non-Article III courts and executive agencies to adjudicate claims based on public and private rights, as described in
more detail below. The difference between public and private rights is that
the former requires no Article III involvement, while the latter requires some
kind of minimal Article III oversight. 27 The First Congress, in fact, permitted
executive officials to decide disputes concerning veterans' benefits and customs duties. 28 As Fallon has noted, because "the First Congress-whose decisions often are viewed as a repository of insight into the historical intent
underlying article Ill-vested responsibilities in executive officers of the
Treasury Department that might instead have been assigned to constitutional
courts," the text of Article III appears to yield to some kind of exception. 2 9 It
is the nature of this exception to which this Essay now turns.
A.

Murray's Lessee and the PossibilitiesofPublic Rights

The genesis of the public-rights exception to Article III arises from the
1856 decision of Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. In
25

THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 475 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). An earlier

draft of the Constitution from August 6, 1787 did not include the provision of jurisdiction where the
United States was a party; it referred only to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Compare id. at 538 ("Mr.
MADISON & Mr. Govr. MORRIS moved to insert after the word 'controversies' the words 'to which the
U. S. shall be a party.' which was agreed to nem: con:"), with Madison'sNotes, supra note 21, at 393.
26 Fallon, supra note 11, at 916.
27 See Peter L. Strauss, The Place ofAgencies in Government: SeparationofPowers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 632 (1984) ("[T]he whole point of the 'public rights' analysis was that
nojudicial involvement at all was required-executive determination alone would suffice.").
28 See Fallon, supra note 11, at 919.
29 Id. (footnote omitted).
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that case, the government had audited the accounts of Samuel Swartwout, the
federal government's tax collector at the port of New York, and determined
that more than $1 million was missing.3 0 After Swartwout fled the country,
the Treasury Department, as permitted by statute, issued a distress warrant
for the sale of Swartwout's property to satisfy in part his debt to the govern32
ment.3 ' The defendant purchased the property under the distress warrant.
The plaintiff obtained the property as part of an execution of a judgment be3
fore the sale to the defendant but after the issuance of the warrant. Although
Swartwout had the statutory right to challenge the distress warrant before the
sale in court, he did not appear to do so.34 In resolving a dispute between
parties seeking to assert title to Swartwout's land, the Court rejected both the
plaintiffs Fifth Amendment Due Process claim and his Article III claim in
his attempt to invalidate the warrant and sale to the defendant.
The Court first held that the Treasury's use of the distress warrant did
not offend due process. Aside from longstanding British practice, the Court
relied upon state and federal practices after the Declaration of Independence
and the Constitution's ratification that permitted the government summary
processes for collecting public debts." The Court recognized that due process
"generally ... includes actor, reusjudex, regular allegations, opportunity to
answer, and a trial according to some settled course of judicial proceedings,"
but the Court said that an exception exists for the government's actions
against a public debtor's body, goods, or land. 6
The Court next held that the distress-warrant proceedings did not offend
Article III. The Court first established that not all adjudication qualifies as
the judicial power. Executive officials frequently must determine facts and
apply them to law." The Court pointed to Congress's Article I authority to
raise revenue and then, once again, relied upon the historical authority of the
executive to decide matters related to revenue and taxing.38
As what appears to be a fallback argument, the plaintiff contended that,
even if the subject matter could be purely executive in nature, the matter was
purely judicial in this particular case because Congress had permitted the
courts to review executive determinations (whether collectors owed money
30 See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 275 (1856).
31

See id. at 274.

32

id.
33 See id. at 280; see also Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 67 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
34 See Granjinanciera,S.A., 492 U.S. at 67 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).

35

See Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 278-80.

Id. at 280 ("There may be, and we have seen that there are cases, under the law of England after
Magna Charta, and as it was brought to this country and acted on here, in which process, in its nature
final, issues against the body, lands, and goods of certain public debtors without any such trial.").
37 See id
36

38 See id at 281-82.
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to the government)." The Court disagreed. The government, by waiving its
sovereign immunity, could and did permit the matter to be both executive
and judicial in character.40 Congress has authority to set the terms of its immunity waiver in judicial proceedings and thereby treat the government's action like a private party's. 4 1
The Court then attempted, in a well-known paragraph, to clarify its view
that some matters are purely judicial, some are purely nonjudicial, and some
can partake of both the judicial and executive character, as Congress chooses:
To avoid misconstruction upon so grave a subject, we think it proper to state that we do not
consider congress can either withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its
nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty; nor, on the other
hand, can it bring under the judicial power a matter which, from its nature, is not a subject for
judicial determination. At the same time there are matters, involving public rights, which may
be presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are
susceptible of judicial determination, but which congress may or may not bring within the
cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper. 42

Accordingly, public rights are those matters that do not concern common law, equity, or admiralty, and which, at Congress's election, do not mandate any judicial determination or review. 43 Instead, Congress can treat these
matters as executive ones, judicial ones, or both. Private rights, in contrast,
are all rights that are not public rights." Exactly what distinguishes private
from public rights, however, is far from clear, as is the justification for the
distinction. But the decision suggested four possible explanations or justifications. 45
First, Murray's Lessee suggested that public rights broadly concerned
matters for which Congress had the "power to collect and disburse revenue,
and to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying that
6
power into effect." 4 111The
obvious problem with this rationale is that if Congress can evade Article III whenever it has the substantive authority to
39 See id. at 282.
40 See id. at 283.
41 See Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284.
42

43

id.

See Strauss, supra note 27, at 632 ("[T]he whole point of the 'public rights' analysis was that no
judicial involvement at all was required-executive determination alone would suffice.").
44 The contrast between private and public matters was foundational to the nineteenth-century legal
zeitgeist. See Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1423,
1424 (1982) ("Although one can find the origins of the idea of a distinctively private realm in the naturalrights liberalism of Locke and his successors, only in the nineteenth century was the public/private distinction brought to the center of the stage in American legal and political theory.").
45 Dick Fallon has suggested four justifications, some of which overlap with those identified here:
those based on sovereign immunity, historical understanding of public rights tied to separation of powers
and broad discretion, the distinction between rights and privileges, and functional necessity. See Fallon,
supra note 11, at 952-53.
46 See Murray'sLessee, 59 U.S. (18 How'.) at 281.
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regulate, Article III becomes a dead letter. Indeed, the Court unanimously
rejected a similar argument in another separation-of-powers decision by explaining that Congress may use its substantive power "so long as the exercise
4
of that authority does not offend some other constitutional restriction."1 And,
at any rate, identifying Congress's permissible substantive authority provides
no obvious distinction between private and public rights, at least when
grounded in federal statutory law.
Second and relatedly, the Court suggested a more limited exception, relying on the fact that all or nearly all governments, due to "[i]mperative necessity," had treated matters related to public taxes as exclusively nonjudicial. 4 8 The benefit of this rationale is that it appears relatively narrow and
enjoys, based on the Court's discussion, significant provenance. Moreover, a
tax-related exception is consistent with Hamilton's contention during the
time of the Constitution's ratification that tax sales were appropriately excepted from jury trials-which would occur in Article III courts-because of
49
efficiency and the needs of the public. But of course, if the exception grows
to include other instances in which Article III proves more costly than other
adjudicatory options, the exception could digest the rule."
Third, again with broad implications, the Court indicated that public
rights included matters in which the United States was a party (by having
waived its sovereign immunity).' The benefit of this justification is that it is
easy to administer: simply evaluate the parties to the dispute. But even if one
exempts criminal matters from the public-rights exception, this justification
would permit agencies or Article I courts to resolve matters without Article
III oversight on all regulatory matters as long as an agency is a party. The
public-rights exception would then have force in those cases in which the
reasons for Article III are at their zenith-where the government has an interest in the litigation. A party-based exclusion has the additional

47

Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976) (per curiam).

48

Murray'sLessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 282.

49 THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 499 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). Note, however, that Hamilton was discussing the right to a jury trial and not the reach of Article III.
50 Indeed, Professor Martin Redish has argued that "[i]n each instance in which the Court has em-

ployed such an approach-either explicitly or implicitly-the competing legislative interest has been relatively minimal, but nonetheless has proved victorious." Redish, supra note 11, at 222. In fact, when
Congress in the twentieth century changed the name of the United States Court of Custom Appeals to the
United States Court of Patent and Customs Appeals and enlarged its jurisdiction, the House appeared to
endorse such a broad exception. The House included comments from Representative (and former Univer-

sity of Pennsylvania law professor) George Graham in the Congressional Record to "establish the constitutionality of the act." 68 CONG. REc. 3181 (1927). Graham argued that Article III permitted subjectmatter exceptions, such as those for intellectual property, taxation, public land, and Indian Affairs. See id.
at 3181-82 (quoted in Wilber Griffith Katz, FederalLegislative Courts, 43 HARv. L. REV. 894, 922-23
(1930)).
51

See Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 283.
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awkwardness of excluding controversies from courts' jurisdiction that Article III expressly describes as part of the judicial power.
Finally, Murray's Lessee suggested that public rights consisted of matters related to dispensed privileges, such as the privilege to sue the government because it had waived its sovereign immunity from suit.5 2 This final
understanding would not reach all matters in which the United States was a
party. Instead, in Professor Gordon Young's words, it would reach only those
kinds of claims "that Congress may dispose of itself or delegate to the executive branch." 5 3 The benefit of this approach is that it fits well with a structural understanding that Congress (through private bills) or the executive
(through statutory directive) can bestow benefits without implicating due
process or the necessity of judicial intervention. Decisions concerning benefits would not trigger due process because, as is most relevant here, they
would not deprive one of liberty or property.5 4 Indeed, as to the role of Article
5
III courts, the Court in Decaturv. Paulding"
had already indicated that it had
no concern with the Executive deciding to whom to deny benefits and that
judicial interference should be discouraged.56 A privilege-based understanding is also consistent with Murray'sLessee's citation to decisions concerning
the bestowed privileges of land grants.17 But this justification, like the others,
permits Congress to ignore Article III's reach to matters governed by federal
law, despite the lack of any textual basis for doing so.
As to the final two rationales, a sovereign-immunity-based justification-either as a necessary predicate for the government to be a party or as a
government-bestowed benefit-has its own difficulties. Despite received
wisdom, immunity did not arise from the idea that the king could do no
wrong. Instead, it arose from feudal concepts: unlike a serf to her lord or a
peer to his sovereign, no one sat above the king in a hierarchy to judge him."
Of course, as the Supreme Court itself has recognized, American constitutional government does not suffer from these feudal problems because it
52 See id. at 283-84. In one of its more recent Article III decisions, the Supreme Court relied
upon
sovereign immunity in justifying the public-rights exception in Murray's Lessee. See Stern v. Marshall,

564 U.S. 462, 489 (2011) ("The challenge in Murray's Lessee to the Treasury Department's sale of the
collector's land likewise fell within the 'public rights' category of cases, because it could only be brought
if the Federal Government chose to allow it by waiving sovereign immunity. The point of Murray'sLessee
was simply that Congress may set the terms of adjudicating a suit when the suit could not otherwise
proceed at all." (internal citations omitted)).
53 Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and the Federal Judicial Power: From Murray's Lessee

Through Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REv. 765, 793 (1986).
54 U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("No person shall. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law ....

).

55 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840).
56 Id. at 516.
57
58

See Young, supra note 53, at 799.
Kenneth S. Klein, The Validity ofthe Public Rights Doctrine in Light ofthe HistoricalRationale

of the Seventh Amendment, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1013, 1039 (1994); see also Nevada v. Hall, 440
U.S. 410, 414-15 (1979), overruledby Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019).
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5 9
creates three separate branches of government with assigned functions. And
because the British sovereign could in some circumstances be sued in the
common law courts by 1791, it is far from clear that the constitutional drafters would have intended for sovereign immunity to permit the government's
broad exception from Article III courts.6 0 What is more, the drafters expressly
identified controversies in which the United States was a party as falling
within the judicial power of Article III courts. Finally, if waiver of sovereign
immunity is a sufficient benefit to ground the privileges-based rationale, the
privileges-based rationale becomes coextensive (or nearly so) with the partybased approach and suffers from the latter's substantial drawbacks.
Even normatively, the sovereign-immunity rationale is problematic.
Sovereign immunity promotes governmental efficiency by keeping the government out of litigation and removed from judicial oversight. But this efficiency undermines competing notions of rights having remedies and of limited, checked government.' Relatedly, as Professor Martin Redish has argued, the "'greater-includes-the-lesser' argument," that Congress can create
its own non-Article III fora whenever it allows itself to be sued, runs contrary
to the maxim that Congress cannot include unconstitutional conditions on
62
benefits or other legislation.
Young argued that, of these rationales, the privileges-based understand63
ing was likely the one that the Court had in mind. He notes that the case
was one of many (before and after Murray's Lessee) that concerned the executive's awarding of benefits, the most significant manner in which the federal government would have impacted private interests.64 Both kinds of ex65
ecutive decisions proved, in practice, nearly unreviewable. Young concluded:

59 See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 206 (1882) (noting the difference between British and
American forms of government, and stating "it is difficult to see on what solid foundation of principle the
[government's] exemption from liability to suit rests").
60 See Klein, supra note 58, at 1039-45. Klein notes that three offive justices in Chisolm v. Georgia,
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), discussed the federal government's sovereign immunity and came to different

conclusions. Id. at 1044. Despite the earliest Justices' disagreement on the issue, Chief Justice Marshall,
without analysis, later deemed the government's sovereign immunity as "universally received opinion" in

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411 (1821). See also Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18 (1963) (concluding that history "suggestled] that the so-called doctrine of sovereign immunity was largely an abstract idea without determi-

native impact on the subject's right to relief against government illegality" by the time of the American
Revolution).
61 See Fallon, supra note 11, at 954-55.

62

See Redish, supra note 11, at 212-13.

63

See Young, supra note 53, at 795-801.

See id at 797. Perhaps Murray's Lessee, as opposed to a case founded on the benefit of waived
immunity, could be best considered a case concerning an executive determination (audit and levy) related
6

to a prior granted privilege (employment as a tax assessor).
65 See id at 819.
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[T]he language of ... later [Supreme Court] cases and the failure of litigants to seek review
by means of certiorari, reflect a perspective from which executive adjudication in benefits
cases had come to be seen as legitimate executive action and truly a thing apart from the judicial in its constitutional sense.6 6

To be sure, Young argued, the Court did not refer to Murray's Lessee
in refusing to interfere with executive decisionmaking in later benefits cases;
instead, it relied on notions of delegated congressional authority, proto-notions of standing, or limits on mandamus relief. 67 But the failure of the Court
to refer to Murray 's Lessee may not be as problematic as it may first seem.
The benefits cases arose, Young argues, in an era before the concept of unified administrative law had purchase on the bar and legal scholars.68
The problem with Young's theory of how to understand Murray 's Lessee is that he must extend the notion of governmental privilege to its breaking
point. The putative benefit at issue in Murray's Lessee was the waiver of
sovereign immunity. The government there was not bestowing any benefits
in the nature of money or land on anyone. Instead, it was taking property
from a public debtor to satisfy an existing debt. The parties invoking the
courts were only seeking to determine who owned the realty at issue. Murray 's Lessee seems different in kind than other benefits cases (such as land
grants, veterans' benefits, etc.), and this difference may explain its absence
from the Court's benefits cases. Nonetheless, even if Murray'sLessee does
not fit into the privileges mold, Murray's Lessee can still support, as discussed in Part III, a privileges-based rationale.
B.

The Expansion ofPublic Rights

With the expansion of the federal administrative state came the expansion of the public-rights exception. The key extension came with the understanding of public rights to include governmental regulation of private parties
that affected public interests, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission's
regulation of common-carrier railroads.69 And from there came the expansion
of public rights to include federal regulation by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the Department of Agriculture of ordinary businesses that
did not qualify as common carriers." With these later cases, there was no
bestowed privilege or benefit, even in the broad sense of permitting a common carrier (with monopoly-like power) to operate; instead, it was a form of
everyday enforcement of statutory standards."
66
67
68
69
70

See id. at 802 (footnote omitted).
See id. at 802-03.
Id. at 799-800.
See Young, supra note 53, at 817-19.
See id. at 818.

71

See id at 821.
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By extending public rights to matters in which the government regulated
businesses that were not common carriers (and thus received no governmental common-carrier privilege), the understood justification for the publicrights exception changed. And more than once. Sometimes the justification
was party-based. For example, a few decades later, the Supreme Court in
Crowell v. Benson7 2 defined public rights as "those [cases] which arise between the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with
the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative
departments."" Other times the justification was subject-based. In a decision
4
a term before Crowell, the Court in Phillipsv. Commissioner1 explained that
Murray 's Lessee was not limited to suits involving the government and a tax
collector, who had the privilege of being the government's agent." Instead,
the "underlying principle ... was ... the need of the government promptly
to secure its revenues." 7 6 The shift from a benefits-based to a party-based or
subject-based justification is not surprising. After the extension of public
rights to general regulatory actions that bestow some public benefits, Professor John Dickinson, a leading administrative-law scholar in the early twentieth century, recognized that the distinction between public and private rights
was difficult to maintain; to varying degrees of directness or remoteness, private rights impact public welfare.7
By the end of its development decades later, the public-rights exception
was potentially all consuming. In Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural
Products Co.," the Court considered arbitration proceedings held under the
9
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. Before registering a
pesticide, manufacturers had to submit safety and environmental data to the
EPA. 0 To render the registration process more efficient, the statute permitted

72

285 U.S. 22 (1932).

73

Id. at 50.

74 283 U.S. 589 (1931).
75 Id. at 596.
76 Id. As Young notes, Phillips continued the expansion of public rights by "permit[ting] the federal
government to use agencies to determine, at the trial level, monetary obligations, imposed under otherwise
constitutional statutes, owed it by private citizens." Young, supra note 53, at 836. Notably, during debates
over agency adjudication under the Customs Administrative Act of 1890, representatives (including thenRepresentative and later Associate Justice Joseph McKenna) discussed exceptions from Article III in
terms of privileges and benefits. See Aditya Bamzai, Taft, Frankfurter, and the First PresidentialForCause Removal, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 691, 715-16 (2018).
77

JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED

STATES 28 n.49 (1927). The Supreme Court echoed Dickinson's sentiments in Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502, 524-25 (1934) ("No exercise of the private right can be imagined which will not in some respect,
however slight, affect the public; no exercise of the legislative prerogative to regulate the conduct of the
citizen which will not to some extent abridge his liberty or affect his property.").
78 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
79 Id. at 571.

80

Id.

2019]

DUE PROCESS FOR ARTICLE III

689

manufacturers to rely on another manufacturer's previously submitted data.I'
The relevant statute provided arbitration for disputes over the appropriate
compensation for the data-sharing manufacturer.8 2 The arbitrator's decision
was nearly unreviewable.83 The Court held that the arbitration proceedings,
whose rule of decision was federal law, qualified for the public-rights exception and thus did not offend Article III.84
Once again, the Court relied upon a different rationale for invoking the
public-rights exception. By applying the exception to disputes between two
private parties, it rendered a party-based rationale inapplicable." In fact, it
expressly stated that Crowell had never created a bright-line test based on
whether the government was a party; instead, the Court took a functionalist
approach to Article III.86 Likewise, because the compensation at issue in
Thomas was between two private parties, the Court could not and did not rely
upon the revenue or taxing exception. Although the data was part of a licensing scheme and thus might have related to governmental benefits, the Court
did not (at least directly) use a benefits-based rationale. Instead, the publicrights exception applied because the "registration serve[d] a public purpose
as an integral part of a program safeguarding the public health" and because
"Congress has the power, under Article I, to authorize an agency administering a complex regulatory scheme to allocate costs and benefits among voluntary participants in the program without providing an Article III adjudication." 7 The rationale sounds similar to the suggestion in Murray's Lessee
that Congress can except matters from Article III courts when those matters
properly fall under Congress's substantive authority under Article I, limited
perhaps by functional necessity or agency expertise in administering a complex program."8 Thomas demonstrated that the public-rights exception was a
Rubenesque doctrine: large, baroque, and strangely seductive.
Since the exception's high-water mark in Thomas, the Court has candidly recognized the doctrine's inconsistency 9 and suggested narrower
82

Id.
See id. at 574 n.1.

83

See id. Courts could review the arbitral decision only for "fraud, misrepresentation, or other mis-

81

conduct." Id. at 573-74 (quoting 7 U.S.C.
84 See Thomas, 473 U.S. at 589.
85

§

136a(c)(1)(F)(iii) (2012)).

In fact, the Court stated, "[i]nsofar as appellees interpret that case and Crowell as establishing

that the right to an Article III forum is absolute unless the Federal Government is a party of record, we
cannot agree." Id. at 586. The Court later stressed that Crowell concerned private rights not because of
the parties, but because Congress had substituted a statutory cause of action for a preexisting right in
admiralty. See id. at 587; see also Young, supra note 53, at 855.

86 See Thomas, 473 U.S. at 585-87.
87 Id. at 589.
88

To ensure that no potential justification from Murray's Lessee went ignored, in concurring with

a later decision, Justice Scalia relied upon the sovereign-immunity rationale when fashioning the bound-

aries ofpublic rights and criticizing Thomas' capacious understanding. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 68 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
8 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 488 (2011).
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90
the Court, in considering the Article I bankrationales. In Stern v. Marshall,
ruptcy court's resolution of certain state-law claims, described the holding in
Murray 's Lessee as based on notions of sovereign immunity, but also
acknowledged the Court's more functional approach in Thomas and later
cases.9 1 Likewise, in its most recent decision, Oil States Energy Services,
LLC v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC, 92 the Court considered whether a federal administrative agency, the Patent and Trademark Office, could reconsider and revoke earlier granted patents upon the request of a patent owner's
competitor. 93 In holding that the public-rights exception applied to reconsideration of a granted public franchise, the Court relied in tandem on the partybased and benefits-based rationales. 94
Given the numerous potential theoretical justifications for the publicrights exception and its functional orientation, it is not surprising that nonArticle III adjudication has a wide berth. As Fallon noted after Thomas,

[A]rticle I courts [through various exceptions to Article III, including the public-rights exception] not only enjoy entrenched status; they have been permitted to adjudicate, at least in some
circumstances, virtually all of the kinds of cases that are heard in article III courts, including
criminal cases and civil disputes arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
95
States.

C.

The Public-Rights Paradoxand Criticism

The public-private-rights dichotomy has taken on a life of its own, having severed its umbilical cord with the purposes of Article III. Categorizing
rights as public or private-whether based on the government's status as a
party, a particular subject matter, the presence of government benefits, or a
complicated regulatory scheme-largely, if not entirely, does the heavy lifting in Article III doctrine. But these categories' existence is, at the very least,
odd. They find no obvious basis in the text of Article III. And they act indifferently, if not contrary, to Article III's purposes. In other words, categories
that had been intended to be the means of identifying Article III's reach have
become ends in themselves.9 6 In fact, even Justice White, who adopted a
functional approach to Article III that generally limited its reach, indicated
that his position arose from precedent, not first principles. He acknowledged

90 564 U.S. 462 (2011).
91 See id at 488-92.
92 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018).
93 Id at 1372.
94 See id at 1373.
95 Fallon, supra note 11, at 923 (footnote omitted).
96 For example, the Court recently in Oil States quickly declared victory after identifying the patent
reconsideration as concerning public rights without considering the purposes or text of Article III. See Oil
States, 138 S. Ct. at 1373.
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that the robust Article III position of the formalists, such as Justice Brennan
and many scholars, was "well founded in both the documentary sources and
the political doctrine of separation of powers that stands behind much of our
constitutional structure."9 7
To begin, the text of Article III does not support the public-rights exception.98 The text says nothing about public or private rights. Yet, if anything, what it does say cuts against exceptionalism for public rights. When
defining "the judicial Power" of Article III courts, recall that Article III includes "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution [or] the
laws of the United States," as well as "Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party."" To be sure, the Founders understood that state
courts could be the only trial courts to hear disputes concerning federal law
and thus that non-Article III courts could entertain these cases.'" But the
state courts' existence and jurisdiction do not mean that Article III permits
Congress to establish non-Article III courts or permit executive agencies to
hear similar cases. The use of state courts separates the federal political
branches from the judiciary and thus provides a separation of powers via federalism. The use of Article I courts or agencies does not do so. 101
Furthermore, the purposes of Article III do not support the exception.
Recall that Article III seeks to provide judicial impartiality and ensure separation between the judicial and political branches. But by denying Article III
tribunals when the government is a party, waives its sovereign immunity,
seeks to raise revenue, or awards benefits, the public-rights exception permits
Congress to ignore Article III courts when the political branches have an interest in the litigation. 1 0 2 This is most obviously true when the government is

9

See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 93 (1982) (White, J., dis-

senting).

98 See Redish, supra note 11, at 205 ("[T]he language and logic of article III do not justify the
public-private right dichotomy.").
99 U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1.
100

See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text; see also Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187

(1943) ("Article III left Congress free to establish inferior federal courts or not as it thought appropriate.
It could have declined to create any such courts, leaving suitors to the remedies afforded by state courts,
with such appellate review by this Court as Congress might prescribe.").

101 See Redish, supra note 11, at 225-26 n.169.
102 See Fullerton, supra note 17, at 231; see also Redish, supranote 11, at 210 ("The danger of both
potential federal governmental domination of the federal judiciary and potential governmental displeasure
with judicial decisions is at a minimum in suits between private individuals involving state-created com-

mon law rights."); id. at 213-14; Young, supra note 53, at 836-37 (noting that government is more likely
to influence judges on matters related to revenue). One scholar has noted that a similar paradox exists

with the Seventh Amendment, which the Supreme Court has indicated does not apply to public rights
decided in a non-Article III forum, saying: "[T]he Seventh Amendment is grounded on the concept of the
citizens' right to check government power. Therefore, the most unlikely exception to the amendment
would be in cases involving the government as a party." Klein, supra note 58, at 1015.
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a party (or waives its sovereign immunity). 03 Indeed, as Young has noted,
Congress's expanded authority under the Commerce Clause in the past century only heightens concerns over Congress's interest in influencing disputes
to which the government is a party. 104 Conversely, when private parties have
a dispute (usually concerning matters of state law), Article III offers its most
robust protection. Of course, it is in these cases that the political branches
0
would usually have the least interest.
The public-rights exception's indifference to Article III should not be
surprising. The Court in Murray 's Lessee
did not attempt in any of these decisions to ground the dichotomy in the language, policies, or
history of article III; Justice Curtis in Murray's Lessee appeared to do little more than assert
the dichotomy, and subsequent decisions by the Court have assumed the Murray'sLessee analysis to be correct. 106

Nonetheless, even Justices who are more skeptical of a robust public-rights
exception lean heavily on Murray 's Lessee. When dissenting in Oil States,
Justice Gorsuch relied upon Murray's Lessee as providing the "original public meaning" of Article III's extension to "suit[s] at the common law, or in
equity, or admiralty."107 But given that Murray's Lessee was decided nearly
seventy years after the Constitution's ratification, provided no citations for
this limitation to Article III, and failed to discuss Article III's purposes or
even the context of its drafting, Murray's Lessee provides little aid in deciphering original public meaning.
III.

RECONCEIVING PUBLIC RIGHTS

In light of the doctrinal and theoretical mess that has become the publicrights exception, the preferable way to interpret the exception (and Murray's
Lessee) is the privileges-based rationale, grounded in due process. This Part
argues that Article III should be understood as coextensive with the reach of
the Due Process Clause, and accordingly the public-rights exception should
have an inverse relationship with due process's domain. Aside from their
103 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 68 n.20 (1982) (plurality)
("Doubtless it could be argued that the need for independent judicial determination is greatest in cases
arising between the Government and an individual.").
104 Young, supranote 53, at 859.
105 See N. Pipeline,458 U.S. at 116-17 (White, J., dissenting) ("Bankruptcy matters are, for the most
part, private adjudications of little political significance.").
106 Redish, supra note 11, at 207-08. The same ipse dixit occurred later in Northern Pipeline. See
id. at 212.
107 Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1381 (2018)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18
How.) 272, 284 (1856)).

2019]

DUE PROCESS FOR ARTICLE III

693

joint concern for impartial adjudicators,'o due process and Article III both
seek to promote separation-of-powers values. This relationship between Article III and due process has a longstanding, although often overlooked, provenance. Traditionally, Article III only applies when the government is depriving one of vested rights. It would not apply to applications for benefits,
or to those benefits' continuance.
Despite the advantage of a privileges-based approach tied to due process, the theory presents two issues that this Part considers in more detail.
The first issue is that Murray's Lessee should itself be understood as relying
on a separate, narrow subject-matter exception (revenue raising), while referring to the privileges-based approach in its larger discussion of public
rights. The other is that due process's domain has changed since the time of
Murray's Lessee. This Part considers, without resolving, whether the publicrights exception should evolve alongside due process or track the traditional
triggering conditions for due process.
A.

Due Process andSeparation ofPowers

Contrary to the received wisdom that due process, unlike Article III, has
no "important separation-of-powers dimension,"' 09 the relationship between
due process and separation of powers was an essential concept at the Founding and for decades after, including at the time of Murray 's Lessee. Chapman
and McConnell recently reminded scholars that due process incorporates
structural constitutional notions and governs Congress, not only courts:
[S]tatutes that purported to empower the other branches to deprive persons of rights without
adequate procedural guarantees were subject to judicial review, and acts by the legislature that
deprived specific individuals of rights or property were subject to similar challenge, either in
the legislative forum itself or in the course of subsequent judicial consideration.110

Indeed, one of the American colonists' chief complaints was Parliament's
deprivation of specific individuals' property rights by its own decree." The
legislature's taking of property and giving it to another without judicial intervention was a "paradigmatic example""1 2 of early due process challenges. I Such an act was not lawmaking-the prospective enactment of law
for the general welfare. Instead, it was a quasi-judicial act-a specific action
108

See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 873-74 (2009) (discussing due process);

supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing Article III).
109

See Fallon, supra note 11, at 942-43 ("[I]n contrast to the due process clause, article IHl has an

explicit and important separation-of-powers dimension.").
110

Chapman & McConnell, supra note 10, at 1679.

111

See id at 1703.

112 Id. at 1755.
113 Id. at 1755-59 (discussing early American examples).
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against an individual based on past actions. 114 As Alexander Hamilton argued, courts have an institutional advantage over legislatures in providing the
procedural safeguards that due process required before deprivation, such as
counsel, rules of evidence, and testimony."II
The Constitution nonetheless gives Congress certain, defined judicial
powers. The House can impeach, the Senate tries impeachments, each house
can determine the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members,
and each can punish and expel members.1 1 6 On the other hand, the Constitution makes explicit that Congress does not have certain judicial powers. It
cannot enact bills of attainder that punish individuals with death,' or, as
explained later by the Supreme Court, other lesser punishments or deprivations.I" But what Congress can do is enact private bills that grant privileges
119
to specific individuals, such as awarding compensation for tort victims,
pensions for veterans and their families, or franchises or other benefits.120
Granting privileges-including not renewing them or even taking the privilege back after a conditional grant-would not implicate due process because
the grant of privileges did not deprive an individual of a right. 121
Chapman and McConnell note that Article III is part of structural due
process, but they accept some kind of public-rights exception (as well as
other exceptions) that would permit Congress to allow other fair and adequate
tribunals. 122 They do so even after acknowledging-with what appears to be
little affection-the growth of public rights alien to the common law and the
Court's application of Mathews v. Eldridge's 23 balancing test to assess due
process's satisfaction. 2 4 It is enough for their argument that "Article III limited the range of cases in which Congress could violate due process by

114 See id at 1727, 1755.
115
116
117

See id. at 1716.
See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 10, at 1719.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.

118 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 461 (1965); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S.
303, 315-17 (1946); Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 377-78 (1867); Cummings v. Missouri, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323-24 (1867). Raoul Berger criticized the Court's expansive view of bills of attainder, arguing that the Founders understood them to include only "legislative condemnation to death without
trial for either treason or felony, accompanied by corruption of blood." Raoul Berger, Bills ofAttainder:

A Study ofAmendment by the Court, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 355, 356 (1978).
119 As William Baude notes, the plaintiff in a suit against the government for harm that the government caused may think of the government as having deprived him or her. But the claim is a "judicial
nullity" because the government has sovereign immunity in the absence of its waiver. See William Baude,

Adjudication Outside Article III, 133 HARV. L. REV. _, *29 (draft) (forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfinabstractid=3194945.
120 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 340-41 (1976).
121 See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 10, at 1719-20.
122 See id at 1720, 1801-04.
123 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
124 See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 10, at 1781.
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exercising quasi-judicial power." 25 But their demonstration that due process
under the Fifth Amendment had a structural component provides insight into
how to define public rights.
The fact that Congress can refrain from creating federal tribunals does
not counsel against tying together Article III and due process. To be sure,
Congress was not required to establish lower federal courts and instead could
have relied on state courts in large part or in toto, depending on the necessity
of appeals to the Supreme Court. 126 But when Congress creates federal tribunals, it must create Article III tribunals unless a textual or historical exception
applies, say, for impeachments, territorial tribunals, or courts martial. Otherwise, Article III and the Constitution's overarching separation of powers becomes nugatory. Indeed, as Fallon has noted, exceptions must be narrowly
circumscribed or else threaten the rule of law itself. 127 In other words, receiving proceedings before a federal tribunal that complies with Article III is part
of the process that is due, as would receiving a state tribunal that complies
with a state's structural requirements.
Likewise, the fact that the Court in Murray's Lessee discussed due process and Article III separately does not undermine Chapman and
McConnell's argument, although it does suggest that the Court was still
working out the provisions' relationship. To be sure, the Court did not simply
say that Article III and due process follow along the same path. But the Court
relied, at least in part, on the same historical analysis for its due process and
Article III discussions. 128 Due process would normally apply to deprivations
of property such as seizing one's real estate, yet historical practice suggested
the existence of a revenue-collector exception.1 29 The Court relied upon history as part of its Article III exceptionalism in Murray 's Lessee 30 before, as
discussed in Part III.C, it went further in dicta to provide more guidance on
the scope of Article III.131

125

Id. at 1720.

126
127

See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16,
See Fallon, supra note 11, at 953.

128

Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 280-82 (1856).

§ 3.2,

at 176-91.

The Supreme Court's recent distinction between Article III and due process in Oil States presents a similar
issue. The Court did not treat the issues as related. In fact, after holding that the agency at issue could
reconsider and revoke issued patents under the public-rights exception, it expressly reserved due process

questions. See Oil States Energy Serys., LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373-75,
1379 (2018). But the holding is not necessarily contrary to a structural understanding of due process. If

the public-rights exception applies, neither due process nor Article III requires Article III involvement.
Due process, however, has other dimensions under modem doctrine: the fairness of its process, see Mur-

ray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 276-77, and impartiality, see Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188,
196-97, 200 (1982) (noting that due process requires impartial agency adjudicators).
129 See Murray'sLessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 281-82.
130
131

See id.
See id. at 284-85.
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The relationship between due process and Article I thus helps inform
the reach of the public-rights exception.
First, the public-rights exception should account for separation of powers, the concern that due process and Article III share. By limiting legislatures
to lawmaking and not the adjudication of specific individuals' rights unless
the Constitution permits otherwise, due process cabins the branches' functions. For its part, Article III promotes the separation of powers by protecting
judges from the political branches, limiting judges to exercising judicial
power, and broadly defining federal jurisdiction to include cases concerning
federal law and controversies in which the United States is a party. Their
shared purpose is important because separation of powers was a novel feature
of the American Constitution. Britain's parliament could make law and its
House of Lords served as the court of last resort.132 But American states,
which had followed Britain's lead, quickly provided at least some separation
of powers after declaring their independence.'
Second, due process's structural coloring provides support for distinguishing the deprivation of rights from the granting of privileges for triggering both due process and Article III. Indeed, Chapman and McConnell noted
that "[a]ntebellum courts upheld private acts that were challenged on due
process and separation-of-powers grounds precisely because the legislature
had not deprived anyone of a right." 3 4 Early American courts largely focused
their due process efforts on vested property rights, not mere expectations for
a future vested right. '" Divesting vested property rights was a judicial function according to two leading early constitutional scholars, Justice Joseph
Story and Theodore Sedgwick.13 6 These protected vested rights included
those that arose from public charters.13 7 Consistent with this understanding,
the Supreme Court later in the nineteenth century noted that the legislature
could not take the following actions consistent with due process of law: "acts
of attainder, bills of pains and penalties, acts of confiscation, acts reversing
judgments, and acts directly transferring one man's estate to another, legislative judgments and decrees, and other similar special, partial and arbitrary
3
exertions of power under the forms of legislation." 1

132

See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 10, at 1729-30.

133

See id.
See id. at 1734.
Id. at 1737-38.
Id. at 1738. As Chapman and McConnell note, the legislature could still regulate the use of prop-

134
135
136

erty, regulate liberties prospectively, and take vested property if it paid just compensation, as required

under the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 1739-40.
137

See id. at 1762.

138

Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 536 (1884).
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Uniting Article III andDue Process

By understanding Murray 's Lessee in the context of structural due process, the privileges-based rationale comes forward as the preferable way of
grounding the public-rights exception. Limiting public rights to those that
concern the granting of privileges does not offend the separation of powers.
Congress has the authority on its own-without any Article III involvement-to grant privileges or compensatory awards to individuals through
private bills. 139 This concept may also extend to the prospective regulation of
common carriers who have, in essence, the benefit of a monopoly. Likewise,
due process, as originally understood, permits the government to reconsider
conditionally vested rights. 140 It is this authority that Congress can delegate
to executive agencies to limit the burdensomeness of determining whom to
privilege-whether by providing land grants, war pensions, legal residence
status, or compensation for the government's torts.141
What Article III and due process would not countenance is Congress or
the Executive depriving someone of property already vested or a liberty right
already exercised. This dichotomy between what Congress can and cannot
do on its own accord are part of even twentieth-century descriptions of public
rights, which are limited to that which Congress "itself [has] the power to
decide." 42 Congress may delegate to courts or to the executive those matters
that Congress can decide.1 43 But Congress cannot deprive an individual of his
or her vested rights or delegate to agencies the power to deprive vested
rights.144 Under a privileges-based approach, the Court took a wrong turn in
permitting agencies to adjudicate enforcement actions against firms or individuals who simply enter commerce or have some effect on a federal interest
(like the waters of the United States). These individuals do not benefit from
any granted interest. Nonetheless, current doctrine permits agencies like the

139 Although the Court has appeared to accept Congress's ability to enact private bills, see, e.g.,
United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 154 (1963), the constitutional basis for Congress's power to do so
has never been the subject of significant judicial inquiry, see Note, PrivateBills in Congress, 79 HARV.
L. REv. 1684, 1685 (1966).
140 See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1375-76
(2018) (discussing public franchises); Young, supra note 53, at 805 ("In the early cases, the courts sought
to determine whether the interest under consideration was a vested property right or something close to
it.").
141 See Young, supra note 53, at 797-98.
142 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932) (quoting Exparte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451
(1929)).
143 See id.
144 See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 10, at 1803 ("That is, Congress may authorize courts at
all only because the Constitution either expressly or implicitly gives it power to do so. It has no inherent
judicial power that it may delegate to another body.").
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FTC to issue cease-and-desist or stock-divestiture orders to those who have
simply entered interstate commerce.145
The Supreme Court's most recent foray into Article III in Oil States
echoes these structural concepts, and its decision is consistent with them. The
majority determined that Congress could permit an agency to reconsider a
granted patent or franchise because the grant was conditioned.146 This understanding is consistent with early understandings that conditional franchises,
to which the majority pointed, had not fully vested and thus permitted executive determination.1 47 Justice Gorsuch, in dissent, more expressly revived
the privileges-rights distinction. He argued that Article III courts had to decide whether to revoke, as opposed to grant, a patent: "[j]ust because you
give a gift doesn't mean you forever enjoy the right to reclaim it. And, as
we've seen, just because the Executive could issue an invention (or land)
patent did not mean the Executive could revoke it." 48 His reading of the history was that divestment of patents and land grants implicated Article 111.149
Indeed, he relied on a statement from an 1898 decision that said that executive revocation of a patent would "deprive the applicant of his property without due process of law, and would be in fact an invasion of the judicial branch
of the government by the executive."' 50 Regardless of their narrow disputes
over the appropriate understanding of the history of patent revocation, the
Oil States opinions are consistent with the benefits-based rationale because
they are getting at whether the rights at issue had fully vested and, accordingly, whether a deprivation had occurred.
The other rationales for the public-rights exception in Murray 's Lessee
do not align as well with a structural understanding of due process. The congressional-authority rationale guts the separation-of-powers goals of due process and Article III. It permits Congress, anytime acting under its Article I
authority, to place the judicial role within courts that it controls or within
agencies that also enforce the law. The party-based rationale is less capacious
but more offensive. It would not expand to all matters based on congressional
authority to regulate, but it would permit the government to avoid Article III
whenever it is a party and thus has the greatest interest in a dispute. These
145 15 U.S.C. § 45(b), (g)(4) (2012). Professor Thomas Merrill noted that "large numbers of agency
adjudicators today-including every administrative law judge employed by the Social Security Administration-has the power to issue self-executing orders," although these adjudicators may be doing so in

matters related to the provision of benefits. Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the
Origins of the Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 982 (2011)
(footnote omitted).
146 See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1370 (2018).
147 Id. at 1377.
148 Id. at 1385 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
149 See id at 1381.
150 See id at 1384 (quoting McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606, 612
(1898)). The majority distinguished the quotation upon which Justice Gorsuch relied as discussing a statute that required judicial revocation. See id. at 1376 n.3 (majority opinion). Under the majority's view,
the quotation, therefore, concerned what the statute, not the Constitution, required as due process.
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matters are the ones in which the government would be most likely to interfere. For this reason, treating the waiver of sovereign immunity as a sufficient
privilege to invoke the public-rights exception goes too far. It would, in practice, permit the government to avoid Article III whenever it is a party. Finally,
the topics-based approach fares no better. Although it may be the narrowest
of these competing justifications, the topics-based approach still permits the
government to avoid Article III courts in matters in which the government
can have a significant interest, such as tax or Indian Affairs. Each of these
three justifications also fails to account for structural due process to the extent
that it reaches more than the granting of benefits. If, say, the taking of individuals' money to pay a tax debt or deprivation of Indian treaty rights falls
under the public-rights exception, the due process complexion of Article III
grows pale.
A privileges-based public-rights exception would lead to one key
change in current doctrine. Article III's minima (whatever that may be)
would apply to all agency actions that deprive individuals of property or liberty. For instance, agencies like the FTC could not preside over enforcement
actions that do not arise from a government privilege (including perhaps monopoly privileges for common carriers) without satisfying Article III's requirements. Nonetheless, agencies could continue, without regard to Article
III, to adjudicate matters related to the granting or reconsideration of conditional benefits-whether social-security benefits, stockbroker licenses, or
common-carrier privileges. If Article III judicial review under the APA is
sufficient to satisfy Article III for enforcement matters,'I as it typically is for
private rights,' 5 2 then very little would change about current agency adjudication. Yet, the benefits-based rationale would permit the public-rights exception to have a much more coherent theoretical grounding and require
some kind of Article III oversight.
C.

ReconsideringMurray's Lessee

All of these considerations, together, indicate how problematic Murray's Lessee itself is. The most readily identifiable benefit in Murray 's Lessee is the government's waiver of sovereign immunity, whereby the tax-collector debtor could have sought (but apparently did not seek in Murray 's Lessee itself 5 3 ) judicial review of the Treasury department's audit before the
See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012) (setting out the standards of review for fact and law).
152 See Stem v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 493-94 (2011) (discussing how Article III is more jealous
of nonagency tribunals deciding private rights than agencies); CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 849-50
(1986) (holding that Article m permits agencies to adjudicate state-law counterclaims between private
parties when Article III courts have judicial review, the parties consented to the agency's authority, and
Congress did not intend to impugn integrity of Article III courts).
153 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 67 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
151
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distress sale.15 4 To the extent that such waiver permitted the individual to recover money damages, it fits the benefits paradigm because Congress could
have paid money as a reimbursement or as damages with a private bill (as it
could for tort or breach-of-contract damages). But if the case instead is understood as permitting the government to deprive one of a property interest
and then subject itself as a party to a Court's nonmonetary remedies, the case
does not fit well. And indeed, it appears that the debtor in Murray 's Lessee
would have had to seek merely equitable remedies after the government
55
seized his property to have the government's distress warrant set aside.'
Framed this way, the government's actions look much more like the government depriving the debtor of a property interest and the debtor then having
to seek an equitable, nonmonetary recovery for the deprivation.
Professor William Baude has recently argued for another limited understanding of Murray 's Lessee. He argues that the decision is best understood
as reaffirming the permissibility of limited temporary deprivations, such as
arrest before trial, before judicial review.' 5 6 This understanding is attractive
because it helps fit Murray's Lessee, where the government seized property
and the landowner could have sought judicial intervention, within a larger,
well-recognized exception.1'5 Indeed, the Court later in United States v.
James DanielGood Real Property"' understood earlier decisions concerning
tax-and-revenue matters as fitting exceptions to due process into the temporary-deprivation exception-usually for matters concerning public health,
public safety, or fiscal emergency-with the "apparent rationale . . of executive urgency."'1 9
The problem with relying on the temporary-deprivation exception is that
the James Daniel Good Court recognized that the government's deprivation
should be only as great as necessary to protect exigent or other important
interests. The Court in that case refused to permit the government to seize a
criminal suspect's real property because the government had not shown that
"less restrictive measures" (such as a lis pendens or bond) would not have
protected the government's interest. 6 0 It is difficult to see how a lis pendens
or other lesser action would not also have protected the government's interest
in Murray 's Lessee. In fact, the James Daniel Good Court hinted as much by

154

Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 280,284 (1856).

155

See id at 284 ("When, therefore, the act of 1820 enacts, that after the levy of the distress warrant

has been begun, the collector may bring before a district court the question, whether he is indebted as
recited in the warrant, it simply waives a privilege which belongs to the government, and consents to make
.

the legality of its future proceedings dependent on the judgment of the court . .
156 See Baude, supra note 119, at *36-*37.
157 See 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVELAW TREATISE § 9.6, at 838 (5th ed. 2010) (discussing temporary deprivations under due process).

158

510U.S.43(1993).

159 Id. at 59-60.
160

Id. at 62.
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noting that it was not "revisiting [the revenue] cases."' Accordingly, although Murray 's Lessee can fit within the temporary-deprivation exception,
its fit is not perfect and appears subject to further consideration. The true
justification appears to rest not on an exigency or limited procedure, but instead on the subject matter at issue.
The best way to resolve the Murray's Lessee paradox-that the case
relied upon a benefits-based rationale but failed to satisfy its own rationaleis to recognize that its discussion of public rights and benefits was something
akin to dicta. The Court began its analysis, consistent with its due process
discussion, by saying that Article III did not apply to the revenue-raising
function at issue. 6 2 The plaintiff even appeared to concede the historical basis for the revenue exception. 163 The Court only then addressed the plaintiff s
backup argument that, because the government had waived its immunity to
permit judicial review of its auditing decision before any distress sale, the
matter had morphed from an executive to a judicial matter., 64 Only in rejecting this argument does the Court turn to its discussion of the government as
a party and go on "[t]o avoid misconstruction upon so grave a subject."' 65
The government's waiver of sovereign immunity, and the terms of that
waiver, demonstrate that Congress sought for the matter in Murray'sLeesee
to have both an executive and judicial character, although Congress, at its
election, could have selected only one in isolation.' 6 6 This formulation simply
raises the following question: What matters can be executive, judicial, or
both? Based on the Court's holding, they include revenue-related matters.
They also appear to include matters related to benefits because the Court specifically referred to the land-grant determinations and judicial decisions approving of these determinations (indeed, these are the only precedents to
which the Court refers).'16 But, notably, the Court did not mention these matters as directly applying to the case at hand; instead, it referred to land-grant
determinations as an additional example-what it referred to as "a striking
instance of such a class of [public rights] cases."' 6
Public rights, accordingly, may be best thought of as including the bestowal of privileges and narrow, historical subject matter-not all waivers of
sovereign immunity, not all instances in which the government is a party, not
all instances in which the Congress can appropriately act. To be sure, the
161 Id at 59.
162 See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 280-81
(1856).
163 See id at 282 ("It was strongly urged by the plaintiffs counsel, that though the government might
have the rightful power to provide a summary remedy for the recovery of its public dues, aside from any
exercise of the judicial power, yet it had not done so in this instance.").
164 See id. at 282-84.
165 Id. at 284.
166 See id at 282-84.
167 See id at 284.
168 Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. at 284.
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limited subject-matter exception is inconsistent with the goals of due process
and Article III. But, as the Court discussed, the exception as it relates to revenue-unlike a broad public-rights exception that reaches all cases in which
Congress acts or the government is a party-had significant historical provenance that excluded it from due process's and Article III's domain. This
Essay's proposed understanding of Murray's Lessee could explain, in part,
the decision's absence from numerous nineteenth-century decisions that recognized the privileges-rights distinction 69 and the Supreme Court's description of Murray 's Lessee in the early twentieth century as pertaining to "the
7
need of the government promptly to secure its revenues."
The Expansion ofDue Process'sDomain

D.

If, as this Essay has proposed, Article III and due process have a symbiotic relationship, should Article III's domain evolve to meet due process's
well-known development in the later twentieth century? The answer is not
obvious.
Modern due process has broader reach. Gone are the days when it only
7
applied to the deprivation of rights, but not the granting of privileges.' ' Instead, due process now applies to the continuation or deprivation of legitimate claims of entitlement.1 72 In practice, this expansion means that due process applies not only to the deprivation of vested rights but also to the cessation of statutory entitlements.17 The main effect of expanding Article III coextensively with modern due process is that Article III would apply to the
denial of already-granted benefits (for, say, no longer meeting statutory requirements)1 74 and perhaps also to reconsiderations of initially granted benefits.

7

This extension of Article III to matters concerning legitimate claims

of entitlement does not necessarily mean a large disruption for much of the
169

See Young, supra note 53, at 795-99.

170
171

Phillips v. Comm'r, 283 U.S. 589, 596 (1931).
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (rejecting the privileges-rights distinction for

purposes of triggering due process).
172 Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). That said, a plurality opinion
in one of the Court's most recent due process cases appears to revive the privileges-rights distinction,
much to the dissenters' astonishment. In Kerry v. Din, the plurality, in rejecting a wife's claim that she
had a liberty interest in her husband's visa status, described spousal immigration as a "matter of legislative

grace rather than fundamental right." 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2136 (2015) (plurality opinion). The dissenting
justices noted that the plurality's "argument rests on the rights/privilege distinction that this Court rejected

almost five decades ago . . . ." Id. at 2143 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
173

Whether modem due process applies to the denial of an application for benefits is less clear. See

generally PIERCE,supra note 157, § 9.4, at 777-78, 781-83 (collecting cases).
174 See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262-63 (stating that beneficiary had a legitimate claim of entitlement
in benefits that government sought to stop providing).

175
(1856).

See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284-85
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current administrative state. As noted in the Introduction, this Essay does not
take a position on what Article III requires when it applies. It may be that
current judicial review under the APA suffices." 6
Having Article HI track modem due process furthers certain values.
First, it respects the historical connection between these two concepts and
provides a coherent and relatively consistent way of limiting the public-rights
exception. Second, it further limits the public-rights exception that seems
largely anathema to Article III's text and purpose. Indeed, Fallon argued that
as due process expanded the notion of protected rights and as standing expanded which rights were judicially enforceable, "[A]rticle III [should]
keep[] pace with other aspects of constitutional law."'7 1
But having Article III follow modem due process has its own theoretical
problems. A privileges-based version of the public-rights exception makes
sense because it does not require judicial involvement in those matters that
Congress could decide for itself. Traditionally, due process respected the
branches' separated powers-Congress can grant and discontinue privileges,
while courts can deprive individuals of rights after certain process. Accordingly, congressional delegations to agencies to award or discontinue privileges also did not require judicial involvement. But the legitimate-claims-ofentitlement paradigm disrupts this symmetry. Congress can still provide benefits by itself and discontinue them without judicial involvement. But if Congress delegates that same authority to agencies, then due process can apply if
there is a statutory entitlement and a deprivation. In other words, although
the relationship between Article III and modem due process can continue
superficially, closer inspection reveals that they would not be fully bonded.
If due process and Article III do not track each other, one subset of claims to
which due process applies (legitimate claims of entitlement) would be able
to operate outside of Article III, while all other deprivations of life, liberty,
or property would require some kind of Article III intervention.
CONCLUSION

This Essay has proposed that the Supreme Court could better read Murray 's Lessee to cabin the public-rights exception in a coherent fashion-a
fashion that honors the purposes of Article III. In short, the public-rights exception should be understood within the context of structural due process and
reach only matters related to privileges (or matters, such as the revenue matters at issue in Murray'sLessee itself, that have arguably always rested outside Article III). This Essay rejects grounding the exception, as the Court has
done in inconsistent ways, on the government's status as a party, waivers of
sovereign immunity, or Congress's use of its Article I authority. The publicrights exception's most noticeable change under this proposal is that it would
§ 706 (2012);
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See 5 U.S.C.

177

Fallon,supra note 11, at 967.

Fallon, supra note 11, at 979-80; Redish, supra note 11, at 227-28.
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not include agency actions to deprive one of vested rights (and perhaps entitlements). But agency proceedings concerning the granting of benefits, and
perhaps their reconsideration and future termination, depending on whether
modern due process applies, can continue-and in a manner that promotes
Article III's values.

